In their paper A Few Bad Apples? Academic Dishonesty, Political Selection, and Institutional Performance in China*, researchers from Harvard University, the University of Hong Kong, and the University of Chicago analyzed 521,546 master’s and doctoral dissertations authored by Chinese graduates. Using text-comparison algorithms, the authors assessed the extent of plagiarism in students’ work by assigning each dissertation a “plagiarism score” reflecting the degree of textual borrowing. This score was used as a proxy for individual dishonest behavior, understood as a realized action rather than an underlying personality trait.
The researchers found that students with higher levels of plagiarism – above the standard eligibility threshold for degree conferral (15%) – were more likely to pursue careers in the public sector (19%) than in the private sector (14%). This gap persisted regardless of the university attended, field of study, graduation year, gender, or academic performance, and was particularly pronounced among tax and customs officials – sectors that disproportionately recruited graduates with the highest plagiarism scores.
Another notable pattern emerged among individuals already working in public service. The higher a person’s plagiarism score during their studies, the greater their likelihood of career advancement, with promotion rates 10–15% faster than those of their peers. In other words, students who engaged in academic misconduct were not only more likely to enter public service, but also tended to climb the career ladder more quickly. This effect held within the same institution, among officials with comparable tenure, and even after accounting for performance indicators.
The authors also examined 140 million judicial decisions issued by Chinese courts between 2014 and 2022. They found that judges who had higher plagiarism scores as students were more likely to issue rulings in favor of government bodies, state-owned enterprises, and large firms. Their decisions were characterized by shorter and weaker reasoning, greater reliance on broad discretionary powers, and a higher likelihood of being appealed.
However, these negative patterns disappeared in cases subject to mechanisms of public oversight – for example, when court proceedings were livestreamed. This finding suggests that such judicial behavior is driven not by lower competence, but by a conscious strategic choice: in the absence of sufficient accountability and transparency, the effects of dishonest behavior among judges become more pronounced.
The researchers also identified signs that dishonesty spreads and becomes self-reinforcing within the system. Newly appointed judges who trained or worked alongside dishonest colleagues were subsequently more likely to exhibit similar decision-making patterns and lower overall quality in their rulings. Likewise, lawyers with histories of academic misconduct were more likely to win cases when appearing before judges with similar plagiarism records.
Overall, the findings indicate that academic dishonesty may be more than an individual pattern of behavior during education. It can also influence recruitment into public service, career trajectories, and the quality of state institutions. In the absence of effective mechanisms of transparency and accountability, such behavioral patterns are not only preserved but reproduced within the system, creating persistent institutional risks.
*The use of the term “bad apples” in the title likely refers to a well-known theoretical model based on the assumption that human nature is imperfect and that an immoral public official – a “bad apple” – will inevitably engage in corrupt behavior. This perspective locates the roots of corruption at the individual level, in personal weaknesses and distorted values.