One of the most common forms of conflict of interest arises when a public official performs regulatory functions in relation to an organization in which he/she or his/her relatives are beneficial owners, participants (e.g., shareholders), and/or hold the organization’s securities.

In such cases, the most obvious measures to manage a conflict of interest – such as recusal from interactions with the organization as part of one’s official duties or the sale of securities – are often not the best option. As an alternative, the legislation of several countries provides for the transfer of securities and/or other assets into fiduciary management.

This article is one of the few publications devoted to the use of special forms of fiduciary management for the purpose of regulating conflicts of interest.

The article is structured as a series of answers to key questions that typically arise when deciding whether to introduce such a mechanism in a given country, including:

• whether the transfer of property and/or securities into fiduciary management is a right or an obligation,
• what special forms of fiduciary management are relevant for anti-corruption purposes,
• what types of assets may be transferred into fiduciary management,
• which categories of persons are subject to relevant requirements,
• how fiduciary managers are selected,
• what should be done with the assets placed under fiduciary management,
• what the role of the authorized government bodies is, etc.

Each question is examined through possible implementation options, including examples from different countries, as well as an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches.