The study focuses on the so-called instrumentalisation of anti-corruption – the use of anti-corruption rhetoric, laws and institutions not to prevent corruption, but primarily for political or other forms of private gain. The authors understand private gain broadly, as extending beyond immediate financial advantage to include partisan gain for a particular group or institution with which the powerholder is associated.

The authors note that anti-corruption equips governments with a wide range of tools, including transaction monitoring, financial audits, measures targeting unexplained wealth, surveillance and other investigative instruments. Anti-corruption cases can result in serious sanctions, including substantial fines, debarment from public office and custodial sentences. The powers governments require to uncover hidden corrupt practices may therefore themselves be vulnerable to abuse for private gain.

How Instrumentalisation Occurs

The study identifies several main methods through which anti-corruption policy can be instrumentalised:

• the use of anti-corruption rhetoric to consolidate power and weaken democratic accountability mechanisms;
• selective or baseless investigation and prosecution of political opponents;
• undue political influence over investigations, including the halting of cases involving political supporters;
• political capture of anti-corruption agencies and other oversight institutions;
• the use of anti-corruption laws and institutions to restrict civic space and the operations of civil society;
• the dismantling or watering down of existing anti-corruption legislation.

The authors also consider a model of the gradual capture of anti-corruption institutions comprising three stages:

1. the first stage is co-optation – the institution’s activities begin to align with the interests of those in power. Georgia is cited as an example, where the anti-corruption agency was involved in enforcing restrictions on civil society;
2. this is followed by controlling – the institution’s ability to act independently in relation to powerholders and their associates is weakened. Mexico is used to illustrate this stage, where anti-corruption arguments were invoked to justify reforms that could limit judicial independence;
3. finally, at the camouflage stage, formal anti-corruption rules remain in place but cease to be applied to members of the ruling group or are enforced selectively. The authors identify signs of this practice in India, where, according to the sources cited in the report, investigations focused on political opponents and some cases were paused or dropped after those under investigation switched allegiance to the ruling party.

The authors also draw attention to a less visible form of instrumentalisation, in which the legal and institutional framework is re-engineered so that anti-corruption bodies formally continue to exist but are effectively unable to challenge the interests of groups linked to those in power. Hungary is examined as an example where, according to the researchers cited in the report, formally functioning anti-corruption institutions remained largely toothless, allowing insider enrichment to continue.

Potential red flags of instrumentalisation identified by the experts include:

• anti-corruption drives intensifying immediately before elections;
• substantial differences in the way cases involving the opposition and those involving government representatives are investigated;
• investigations being dropped after the political allegiance of the person concerned changes;
• sudden turnover in the leadership of oversight bodies;
• legislative changes that weaken the independence of anti-corruption institutions or narrow the scope of relevant requirements.

At the same time, distinguishing legitimate anti-corruption enforcement from its instrumentalisation is not always straightforward. An investigation may have legal merit while still being selectively pursued, and measures that strengthen the position of those in power may, in some cases, genuinely reduce certain forms of corruption.

What the Evidence Shows

The report notes that the instrumentalisation of anti-corruption measures occurs not only in authoritarian regimes but also in electoral democracies. It analyses examples from eight such countries – Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, India, Georgia, Hungary, Mexico, the United States and Poland. Between 2012 and 2024, all eight experienced declines in liberal democratic quality, while their Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) trajectories differed: scores improved in Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, India and Georgia, but deteriorated in Hungary, Mexico, the United States and Poland.

The authors stress that apparent improvements in the control of corruption do not necessarily rule out the instrumentalisation of anti-corruption policy. Governments may reduce certain forms of administrative corruption while simultaneously applying anti-corruption mechanisms selectively, protecting political supporters or weakening independent institutions. Instrumentalisation may also increase real-world levels of corruption because weakened accountability mechanisms allow insider groups to act with impunity.

The report separately considers corruption control in authoritarian states. The authors note that some such regimes may have genuine incentives to reduce particular forms of corruption – especially petty and administrative corruption – where these impede economic development, increase the cost of doing business or discourage inward investment. Authorities may, for example, target extortion by public officials, corruption in customs or collusion in public procurement.

Such policies may lead to improved perceptions of corruption control even in the absence of democratic reform. At the same time, global indices, including the Corruption Perceptions Index, are better equipped to capture administrative and bureaucratic corruption than patronage networks, clientelism or corruption among political elites.

In authoritarian settings, corruption control is also often pursued through a top-down approach involving the centralisation of power, strong sanctions, mass dismissals or arrests, digitalisation and other administrative reforms. According to the authors, this model may be less sustainable because it depends primarily on the political will of incumbent leaders rather than on independent institutions and checks and balances. If anti-corruption measures begin to conflict with other regime objectives, they can be rolled back quickly. Moreover, anti-corruption efforts in such settings may come at the cost of civil liberties.

How to Reduce the Risks

To reduce the risk of instrumentalisation, the authors recommend:

• safeguarding the independence of the judiciary, prosecutors, investigatory bodies and anti-corruption agencies;
• establishing transparent procedures for the appointment and dismissal of their heads;
• protecting the budgets of such bodies from political interference;
• publishing data on case outcomes and providing written, public explanations when investigations are opened or closed;
• ensuring scrutiny by civil society.

Particular attention is paid to international partners and donor-funded programmes. Before funding begins, development partners are advised to conduct robust needs assessments, political economy analysis and appraisals of the human rights and civic space situation, as well as to identify potential red flags of instrumentalisation and agree in advance on possible responses.

Where abuses are detected after a programme is already under way, donors may suspend or terminate support to state bodies, raise concerns through diplomatic channels, communicate those concerns publicly and redirect financial support from state actors to non-state actors. The authors also recommend coordination among development partners, including joint monitoring and the use of information from civil society and international peer review mechanisms.

According to the authors, the ability to recognise instrumentalisation early is important not only to prevent abuse. A better understanding of the phenomenon can also help counter attempts to use allegations of politicisation to delegitimise genuine anti-corruption efforts.